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Background: The problem posed by therapeutic injection is a clinical practice issue that influences health care
quality and patient safety. Although sufficient government subsidy was one of the 12 key interventions to promote
rational drug use initiated by WHO (World Health Organization), limited information is available about the
association between government subsidy and injection use in primary health care institutions. In 2009, National
Essential Medicines System (NEMS) was implemented in China. The subsidy policy plays an important role in
maintaining primary health care institutions. This study explores the impact of government subsidies on the
injection use in primary health care institutions in China.
Methods: 126 primary health institutions were included in this study. Institutions were divided into two groups
(intervention and control groups) according to the median GS (General subsidy per personnel). Propensity score
matching (PSM) was used to minimize the observed covariate differences in the characteristics of the primary
institutions between the two groups. Kappa score was calculated to determine the consistency between the
groups. Paired chi-square test and Relative Risk (RR) were calculated to compare the differences in injection use
between the groups.
Results: Among all the investigated prescriptions, the overall percent of people who received an injection
prescribed was 36.96% (n = 12600). PSM showed no significant covariate difference among the 34 groups obtained
through this analysis. Kappa score (k = −0.082, p = 0.558) indicated an inconsistency between groups and paired
chi-square test revealed a significant difference (p < 0.05) in injection use between the two groups. Relative Risk =
0.679 (95%CI [0.485, 0.950]) indicate that high General subsidy per personnel is a protective factor for primary health
care institutions to prescribe injections properly. The intervention group obtained a higher possibility of using
injection properly.
Conclusions: The overall effect of government subsidy on the use of injection was positively significant. However, the
mechanism by which government subsidy influence injection administration remains unclear, and thus requires further study.
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The quality improvement of medical service and patient
safety is of great importance. The focus on patient safety
has intensified since 1999 [1], and health care quality
improvement has gained increasing attention. Members
of international and national organizations, such as the
Institute for Healthcare Improvement, WHO, the Na-
tional Quality Forum, and the Agency for Healthcare Re-
search and Quality have postulated theories, developed
guidelines, and published reports on this area. However,
theoretical concepts have not been easily or completely
translated into clinical practice regardless of the increas-
ing academic activities [2].
The problem posed by therapeutic injection is a clinical
practice issue that influences both health care quality and
patient safety. WHO estimates that approximately 16 bil-
lion injections are used annually in developing and transi-
tional countries. In particular, the ratio of vaccination
injection to therapeutic injections given is 0.5:9.5 [3]. Since
most medications used in primary health care institutions
can be taken orally, this ratio, along with population-
based injection frequency surveys, has indicated the over-
use of therapeutic injections in developing and transitional
nations. This is a severe problem in China. A large pre-
scription sample in urban community health care institu-
tions across China has shown that the percentages of
injection prescription were 35.4%, 32.4%, and 33.9% in
2007, 2008, and 2009, respectively [4]. Overuse of injec-
tions results in serious consequences.
Multiple factors other than clinical considerations can
influence the decision to prescribe injections. Considering
the characteristics of individual patients and doctors, pa-
tient characteristics, such as age, lower socio-economic
status, and higher co-morbidity have significant effects on
prescription behaviour [5-7]. Physician characteristics, in-
cluding gender, age, time since graduation, and duration
of practice, significantly influence the prescription be-
haviour [5,8,9]. Considering the characteristics of the
facilities and social activities, evidence has indicated
that organizational culture may also be an important
factor in health care performance [10]. Exposure to
direct information from pharmaceutical companies has
been associated with higher prescription frequency,
higher costs, or lower prescription quality [11]. Spe-
cific geographical demand and supply factors of the
areas are also related to the patterns of injection pre-
scriptions [12].
China has experienced significant changes in social
and economic structures since the onset of economic
reforms in 1978. In the healthcare sector these changes
have led to a decreased reliance on state funds [13],
decentralization of public health services, increased
autonomy of health facilities, and increased freedom in
health worker movements. An association betweeneconomic reforms and the growing inequality in health
care service access, increasing medical care cost, de-
creasing public finances, and increasing funds by user
fees has been observed [14]. Hospitals in China provide
subsidized clinical services through the fee-for-service
system allowing physicians to add a 15% mark-up on
medication. This has an influence on physician pre-
scribing factors. Compared with oral formulations, in-
jections are more expensive. The higher cost of
injections entails more profit for the physician [15].
Studies have indicated the mark-up of injections can
reach >15% [16].
In 2009, China launched the essential medicines sys-
tem. This system includes a list of drug formulations,
production, supply, procurement, use, pricing, payment,
reimbursement, quality control, monitoring, and evalu-
ation for the purpose of increasing medicine availability,
reducing drug safety hazards, and minimizing irrational
drug prescription. All of the primary health care institu-
tions (excluding hospitals and private providers) in
urban and rural areas must acquire and use essential
medicines. Government-owned public primary care pro-
viders must sell essential medicines at 0% mark-up in ac-
cordance with current laws [17]. Since 1997, the National
Development and Reform Commission adjusted pharma-
ceutical prices for 24 times. However, regulated price
markdowns have had a limited impact on the increase in
health expenses. Compared with the multiple price adjust-
ments, the essential medicines system is one of the more
effective policies for reducing the soaring drug costs [18].
To support the operation of primary health care institu-
tions and defray the aforementioned costs, the government
has set up a subsidy scheme [19]. Based on this scheme,
the government is responsible for public health service,
emergency expenditures, and personnel expenses, which
include funding for retired personnel, staff training, and re-
cruitment. If all of these subsidy schemes fail to cover the
health expenses, then the balance from the revenue and
total costs become the amount of the subsidy. In this kind
of scheme, the income of primary health care providers
comes mainly from the medical service charges and gov-
ernment subsidies.
Government subsidies can significantly decrease the drug
expenses of a facility, thereby decreasing the use of injection
[20]. However, few statistical data on the direct correlation
between injection prescription and subsidies have been
reported, although WHO has claimed that sufficient govern-
ment subsidy is needed to promote rational drug use. This
particular area of study has gained attention, but “robust”
experimental study designs are limited [21]. This study aims
to fill the gap by examining a sample of primary health care
institutions across China based on the essential medicine
system to provide evidence-based recommendations for pol-
icy development in primary healthcare systems in China.
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Data source and sampling
Using a uniform questionnaire, data were obtained from the
openly available survey of the National Essential Drug Sys-
tem Monitoring Project performed by the Ministry of Health
in six provinces in China from October to December 2011.
The following sampling facilities were used: Shandong
and Liaoning in the east of China, Hubei and Shanxi in
the central part of China, and Shaanxi and Sichuan in
the western part of China. Investigations included 126
primary health care institutions (21 for each province).
These primary health care institutions gave a representa-
tive sample for the overall development of primary
health care services in China.
A systematic method for prescription sampling using
data collected from January to September 2011 yielded
100 randomly sampled prescriptions (10 to 15 prescrip-
tions per month) for each facility.
Statistical variables
We used a matched pair design with propensity score
matching (PSM) to analyze the correlation between gov-
ernment subsidies and injection use. Since there is no
standard to decide whether a primary health institutions
has a high or low government subsidy, General subsidy
per personnel (GS) was used as a criterion. The two
most important components of the current subsidy
scheme are public health service and emergency expend-
iture, as well as personnel expenses (funding for retired
personnel, staff training, and recruitment). Approved al-
location for public health expenditure was comprehen-
sively measured by the amount, which relies heavily on
the approved number of personnel; quality and unit cost,
approved allocation for personnel expenses was consid-
ered by the approved number of personnel and their sal-
ary [22]. Since the number of personnel is a key
consideration in the subsidy scheme, compared to the
total government subsidy, GS more accurately reflects
the standard of government subsidy for this study.
GS is calculated as follows:
General subsidy per personnel ¼ government subsidy
The number of staff
The facilities were grouped according to the median
GS. The facilities with a GS higher than the median were
defined as the intervention group and those with lower
GS than the median were defined as the control group
with reference to some similar study [23].
The outcome indicator (i.e., the injection use) was deter-
mined at a facility level. According to an international
standard recommended by WHO, the facilities with injec-
tion use rate < 24.1% were defined as ‘rational’ and facil-
ities with an injection rate >24.1% were defined as
‘otherwise’ [4].PSM
Propensity score, first proposed by Rosenbaum and
Rubin in 1983 [24], is a function related to multiple co-
variates and represents the combined result of all covari-
ates. PSM balances the covariate difference between
intervention and control groups. The propensity score
also provides a similar randomized processing method
to non-randomized observational studies [25].
PSM estimators can evaluate the effects of interven-
tion by comparing the outcomes in the intervention
group with the same results in the control group. In this
case, intervention represents the high GS and the out-
comes refer to the difference in the use of injection be-
tween the intervention group and the control group.
Control group facilities are suitable matches for inter-
vention group facilities if they have similar observed
characteristics as evaluated by a particular distance
metric, i.e., the propensity score from a logistic regres-
sion model in this case.
PSM was implemented in two steps: (1) the condi-
tional probability of being highly compensated (i.e., the
propensity score) was calculated; and (2) the nearest
neighbors in close proximity to the exposed facility pro-
pensity scores are selected from the control group.
There is an ongoing controversy in the literature as to
which variables to include in the propensity score model.
Variables that are unrelated to the exposure but related
to the outcome should always be included in a PS model
[26]. As to the confounders that associated with both ex-
posure and outcome, evidence has indicted the omitting
of such variables from the propensity score model would
result in biased estimation of the intervention effect
[27]. So in this research, we have selected all variables
available that are potentially related with the inject pre-
scription. The covariates incorporated in the logistic re-
gression model for PSM include the following: the
province and category of the institutions; the number of
staff, outpatients, and emergency patients; medical, exam-
ination, and drug income; and the average salary of the
staff. Since we take GS as a criterion for government sub-
sidy in lieu of total government subsidy, institutions that
have the ability to obtain higher subsidy (given the same
stuff) or smaller number of staff (given the same subsidy)
are more likely to be in the intervention group. Table 1
summarizes the description of these variables. In this
paper, nearest neighbor matching was performed using a
caliper value of 0.003 [28]. We used the caliper matching
with one-to-one matches based on the propensity score.
Data analysis
To analyze the use of injection between groups, the in-
jection rate < 24.1% was defined rational injection use
and the institutions were evaluated as “1;” or otherwise,
“0.” Independent t-test or chi-square test to analyze the
Table 1 Variables descriptions in the logistic model of PSM
Variable name Description
Independent variable GS Intervention group, control group
Dependent variable The number of staff Continuous




the average salary of the staff Continuous
the province of institutions Hubei, Liaoning, Shandong, Shanxi, Shaanxi, Sichuan
the category of institutions Community Health Center (station), Township primary health institutions
Table 2 Injection use and other characteristics of
investigated primary health institutions













Community Health Center(station) 35(27.78%)
Township primary health institutions 91(72.22%)
Number of staff 50.17 ± 37.96
Number of outpatients and emergency
patients
21885.42 ± 21955.53
Medical income (ten thousands Yuan) 643.00 ± 128.45
Examination income (ten thousands Yuan) 299.00 ± 22.94
Drug income (ten thousands Yuan) 985.83 ± 96.03
Average salary of the staff (Yuan) 2368.53 ± 683.51
Note: the total number of sampled institutions was 126. For continuous and
categorical variables, mean ± standard deviation and Frequency (Percent) was
used, respectively.
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fore and after PSM was performed. For the categorical
variables (province and category of institutions), chi-
square test was used to analyze the difference between
groups. For continuous variables (number of staff, out-
patients, and emergency patients; medical, examination,
drug income; and average salary of the staff ), independ-
ent t-test was used. The rational use of injection was the
outcome indicator that we analyzed. After PSM, kappa
score was calculated to determine the consistency be-
tween the groups and paired chi-square test to deter-
mine the difference between intervention and control
groups. Relative Risk (RR) was calculated to estimate the
association between government subsidy and injection
use. The injection use rate and chi-square test was used
to analyze the difference between groups as a further in-
dicator of rate change between the groups. Statistical
significance was accepted at p-value ≤ 0.05 (SPSS 12.0).
Results
Characteristics of the participating primary health care
institutions
Our data showed that the use of injections in primary
health care institutions does not meet the standards.
Only 43 out of 126 institutions satisfied the criterion,
which accounts for 34.13% of the total institutions.
Among all the investigated prescriptions the overall per-
cent with an injection prescribed was 36.96% (n = 12600)
(for rational injection use institutions and irrational in-
jection use institutions, this rate was 14.26% and 48.73%
respectively). About two-thirds of the primary institu-
tions are located in the rural areas. Other descriptive sta-
tistics for the variables are presented in Table 2.
Propensity score estimation
The propensity score was estimated using a logistic re-
gression model of the probability of receiving a high
government subsidy based on the following: number of
outpatients and emergency patients; medical, examin-
ation, and drug income; average salary of the staff; thenumber of staff; as well as province and category of in-
stitutions. We obtained 34 pairs after PSM. The
utilization of the total sample was 54% (68 out of 126).
Table 3 shows the covariate in the pre- and post-match
samples for the intervention and control groups. The
medical income and the average salary of the staff
exhibited a significant difference between the groups
(p < 0.05) before PSM. After PSM, the differences were
insignificant (p > 0.05). Three variables obtained a
higher p-value after PSM. Thus, PSM resulted in a
Table 3 Variables for per- and post-matched samples for the intervention and comparison group
Pre-PSM approach Post-PSM approach
Control group Intervention
group




Hubei 14(22.22) 7(11.11) 0.06 5(14.70) 5(14.70) 0.96a
Liaoning 10(15.87) 11(17.46) 5(14.70) 4(11.80)
Shandong 8(12.70) 13(20.63) 7(20.60) 6(17.60)
Shanxi 13(20.63) 8(12.70) 3(8.80) 6(17.60)
Shaanxi 5(7.94) 16(25.40) 4(11.80) 4(11.80)
Sichuan 11(17.46) 10(15.87) 10(29.40) 9(26.50)
Category of institutions
Community Health Center (station) 18(28.60) 17(27.00) 0.84 8(23.50) 7(20.60) 0.77
Township primary health institutions 45(71.40) 46(73.00) 26(76.50) 27(79.40)
The number of staff 56.37 ± 45.07 43.98 ± 28.21 0.07 51.15 ± 38.05 41.24 ± 28.68 0.23
The number of outpatients and emergency
patients
22731.16 ± 18330.00 21039.6 ± 25185.96 0.67 23201.76 ± 20435.07 19654.26 ± 17183.63 0.44
The medical income (ten thousands Yuan) 156.62 ± 156.64 100.2 ± 115.21 0.02 142.16 ± 147.86 122.01 ± 110.25 0.53
The examination income (ten thousands Yuan) 24.88 ± 37.90 21.00 ± 40.79 0.58 34.43 ± 48.36 20.32 ± 25.21 0.14
The drug income (ten thousands Yuan) 99.69 ± 74.40 92.38 ± 166.95 0.73 101.451 ± 83.69 67.14 ± 57.57 0.053
The average salary of the staff (Yuan) 2117.37 ± 690.21 2619.69 ± 580.78 0.00 2486.08 ± 639.97 2498.22 ± 533.89 0.93
Note: for continuous and categorical variables, mean ± standard deviation and Frequency (Percent) was used respectively. Differences between groups were
tested by independent t test for continuous variables, chi-square test for categorical variables. All p-values were two tailed. ”a” stands for Fisher’s exact probability
for expected count less than 5.
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control and intervention groups. By contrast, three
variables resulted in a slightly lower p-value after PSM.
Effect of government subsidy on injection rate
The McNemar test showed that the rational use of injec-
tion between intervention and control groups was sig-
nificantly different (p < 0.05). Furthermore, Kappa score,
which indicates an inconsistency between the two
groups (k = −0.082, p = 0.558), was calculated. RR score
(RR = 0.679, 95%CI [0.485, 0.950]) indicate that GS is a
protective factor for primary health care institutions to
prescribe injections properly. Compared to the control
group, the intervention group exhibited a lower possibil-
ity (67.9% the possibility in control group) of improper
injection use. The percent of prescription with an injection
prescribed was 42.12% (n = 3400) and 33.79% (n = 3400) for
control group and intervention group respectively. The dif-
ference was statistically significant (χ2 = 50.01, P < 0.0001).
These results show that government subsidy influences in-
jection use.
Discussion
Overuse of injections is still a severe problem in china as
compared to an international standard (13.4%-24.1%)
recommended by WHO. The overall percent with aninjection prescribed was 36.96% (n = 12600) in this
study. This indicates that at least 3 out of 10 patients re-
ceived prescriptions for injections in primary health care
institutions in china. Since evidence has proven that in-
jection prescriptions account for more than one third of
prescription before 2009 (35.4% for 2007 and 33.9% for
2008) [4], there seems to be no significant drop in the
number of injection prescriptions. This conclusion is in
accordance with a previous study which shows that the
NEMP interventions failed to fulfil its goal in reducing
irrational use of injections [29].
By using a survey data set from China, this study dem-
onstrated that government subsidy has a significant ef-
fect. High government subsidy may increase the
possibility of rational injection prescription. Few studies
have used representative survey data to indicate the ef-
fect of government subsidies on injection prescription
utilization. A previous study has suggested that irrational
injection prescription use is observed in primary health
care institutions in rural areas because of the insuffi-
cient government subsidy for both the facilities and
the staff [20]. Another study examined the prescrip-
tion behavior of village doctors and reported that gov-
ernment subsidy can help in the improvement of
prescription quality and reduce the use of injections
and antibiotics [30]. However, these studies were
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the conclusions presented.
Our results show significant implications from a policy
perspective. Despite the Policymakers’ continuous search
for evidence, only a small number of regulatory measure
evaluations have been conducted [31]. Based on the re-
sults obtained in this study, government subsidy has a
significant effect on injection prescribing factors. High
government subsidy may increase the possibility of ra-
tional injection prescriptions based on our survey data
set from China. However, the mechanism by which gov-
ernment subsidy affects injection prescriptions remains
unclear, and thus requires further studies. Given that the
Chinese government increases the financial investment
in health sectors annually, determining the link between
government subsidy and rational drug use is necessary
for proper budgetary planning.
In addition to the positive relation (high GS relate
with high rational injection use), there is still negative
association (high GS with low rational injection use)
presented in Table 4. One likely explanation is that
there are some other complex issues. This might in-
clude staff educational level and idiosyncratic beliefs
on the part of the patient. These variables are not in-
cluded in our study. Further investigation in this area
may explore the limitations of the data collection
methods used.
From a methodological perspective, our analysis used
PSM to determine the effect of government subsidy on
drug use. This study is the first to report on the relation-
ship between government subsidy and drug use in
China. To avoid the risk of bias, we used propensity
scores to estimate the probability that a health sector
would receive a high government subsidy based on spe-
cific characteristics. The propensity score was estimated
using logistic regression, with the subsidy as the out-
come and the background covariates as the predictive
variables. The covariates in both groups within the
propensity-score strata were uniformly distributed. In
our study, 34 pairs of health sectors shared close pro-
pensity scores and similar background covariates. The
uniformity in the measured risk factor distribution indi-
cates that the distribution of unmeasured variables is
balanced, although propensity scores cannot removeTable 4 Case summary after PSM-matching
Control group Total
Rational use Irrational use
Intervention group Rational use 2 13 15
Irrational use 4 15 19
Total 6 28 34
Note: the numbers in every cell stands for pairs under the given condition.hidden biases except to the extent that the unmeasured
prognostic variables are correlated with the measured co-
variates used to compute the score. Therefore, efficient
development of healthcare policies can be supported using
propensity score analysis.
Although this study has explored the positive effects
of government subsidies may have on injection prescrip-
tions, our study has some data limitations which made
the conclusions of this study should be interpreted with
caution. Annual performance evaluations rather than a
sample of a one-year cross-section would have been
more informative. Furthermore, the evaluation method
only allowed us to provide a causal inference on the ef-
fect of a high government subsidy on injection prescrip-
tions to a limited extent. Confounding factors such as
staff educational level and patient beliefs were not in-
cluded in this study. Despite these limitations, our study
has provided information for further investigations in
this field.
Conclusions
This study has observed the injection prescribing prac-
tices in primary health care institutions in China and the
positive effects of government subsidies may have on in-
jection use. The sample consists of a representative sam-
ple of primary health care institutions in six provinces.
PSM, which may partially adjust the confounders, was
used in our study to avoid possible bias that may influ-
ence the results. Our findings suggested that a high gov-
ernment subsidy may promote a rational approach
towards injection prescription practices. However, we
did not investigate the mechanism by which government
subsidy affects injection prescriptions. Thus, further
study on the relationship between injection prescription
and injection use is recommended.
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